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Abstract: Cooperating and trusting behavior may be explained by pref-
erences over social outcomes (people care about others, are unselfish and help-
ful), or attitudes to work and social responsibilities (plans have to be carried
out, norms have to be followed). If the first hypothesis is true, Agreeable-
ness, reporting stated empathy for others, should matter most; if the second,
higher score in traits expressing attitude to work, intrinsic motivation (Con-
scientiousness) should be correlated with cooperating behavior and trust. We
find experimental support for the second hypothesis when subjects provide
real mental effort in two treatments with identical task, differing by whether
others’ payment is affected.
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1 Introduction
The personality of individuals working together in economic organizations
may significantly affect their performance, beyond what standard character-
istics considered by economists, and described by risk attitude, time pref-
erences and effort cost may predict. This insight has made its way in the
business practice. Personality tests are now a frequent practice in the process
of applicant selection in many large firms: recently the BBC News Magazine
reported1 that that 89 of the Fortune 100 companies use some test to assess
the personality of the job applicants. However economic analysis has only
recently started to address the question on how personality affect individu-
als performances, especially when individuals work together and benefits of
cooperation may arise.
We test in particular whether cooperating and trusting behavior can be
successfully explained by a generally empathic attitude, by a helpful and
unselfish orientations to others. In our data, such more favorable inclina-
tion to others is measured by Agreeableness, which explicitly measure stated
cooperation and trust.2
Other possible personality variables that might explain cooperative be-
havior are traits leading to reliability and care in work, consistency in carry-
ing out plans, such as Conscientiousness.3
We present an experiment designed to provide an answer to this com-
plex question in a systematic way. Since our interest is in understanding the
working of real life social institution, we insist that cooperation and trust
should involve a real cost (in our design, a cost of mental effort), rather than
symbolic display of care for others. Our method relies on the comparison
between the performance in a control treatment where effort of an individual
affects his own payment and only his own, and the performance in a treat-
ment (called cooperative) where effort of an individual affects the payment
of a different, randomly chosen, anonymous subject. The tasks in the two
1http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18723950
2We report the statements that enter into the Agreeableness score. Subjects had to
indicate whether they agreed with the statement as a description of them. The number
indicates the order of presentation, (R) indicating reverse coding: 2. Tends to find fault
with others (R). 7. Is helpful and unselfish with others. 12. Starts quarrels with others
(R). 17. Has a forgiving nature. 22. Is generally trusting. 27. Can be cold and aloof (R).
32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone. 37. Is sometimes rude to others (R). 42.
Likes to cooperate with others.
3Here are the statements entering into the Conscientiousness score: 3. Does a thorough
job. 8. Can be somewhat careless (R). 13. Is a reliable worker. 18. Tends to be
disorganized (R). 23. Tends to be lazy (R). 33. Does things efficiently. 38. Makes plans
and follows through with them. 43. Is easily distracted (R).
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treatments are identical, so the two treatments differ in the way in which
final payoffs are computed, not the way in which effort is provided or effort
translates into performance. More precisely in the control treatment each
subject performs three series of ten additions and he is paid proportionally
to the number of correct answers. In this treatment the final payment de-
pends only on the effort of the subject. In the cooperative treatment each
subject is part of a team of two randomly and anonymously matched indi-
viduals, and performs one series of addition for the partner, and one for his
own use. Hence the final outcome of each teammate is dependent on the
effort of both. The interaction is one-shot and simultaneous.
As they do the first addition subjects have to anticipate the quality of
the input that others will provide them; so their effort will be higher if they
trust others. Instead, when they do the second addition, they might consider
that their output will influence the payment to others; so their effort will be
higher if they care about the outcome of others (according to the hypothesis
that other-regarding preferences drive their behavior) or if they feel that
norms of social behavior should be followed, or they are concerned about
the response and opinion of others to their behavior. Our measure of the
personality characteristics is based on the Big Five personality scale (Costa
and McCrae, 1992), arguably the most common and studied measurement
method.4
Our results show that some personality traits are associated in a signif-
icant and positive way to the effort provision in the cooperative treatment.
These effects are significantly different, both in terms of quantity and qual-
ity, from the effect on the same task when this is performed individually.
Agreeableness plays no role, thus the first hypothesis finds little support.
Subjects with higher Conscientiousness and Neuroticism score are relatively
more effective in the cooperative tasks, although in different way. While sub-
jects with higher Neuroticism score are more effective in helping the partner
to achieve better results, those with higher score in Conscientiousness are
better in both trusting and helping. The effect of Neuroticism is particularly
interesting. It is negative when individuals have a full incentive to provide
optimal effort, but seems to turn positive when this effort is devoted to help
4The Big Five personality traits are five broad dimensions that are used to describe
human personality. They are Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness,
and Neuroticism. See Anderson et al. (2011), p. 3-4 for a synthetic description of the big
five traits.
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the other. 5
This paper suggests a new line of research based on the integration of
personality traits with incentives in conditions of informational asymmetries.
Generally this literature, based on the principal agent model, assume the
existence of individuals’ heterogeneity with respect to preferences for goods,
skills or risk attitudes in line with the rest of the economic literature (see e.g.
Bolton and Dewatripont 2001).6
The two traits that improve the cooperative outcomes are Neuroticism
and Conscientiousness, the traits usually associated with different forms of
motivation. Neuroticism is usually associated with negative incentives (i.e.
fear of failing or not achieving a result); and Conscientiousness representing
the ability to set and maintain longer-term goals.7 To the best of our knowl-
edge, in this paper we perform the first laboratory experiment in economics
where the final outcome is based on real effort rather than monetary transfers
Hirsh and Peterson (2009) and Pothos et al. (2010) link personality traits
to strategic behavior in experiments using the prisoner dilemma framework.
Anderson et al (2011) analyze the effect of traits on the trust game using a
large sample of truck driver trainees. Becker et al. (2012) analyze the effect
of the personality traits on the trust game, in the dictator game, and in the
punishing behavior in a modified prisoner dilemma game. Filiz-Ozbay et al.
(2013) focus on the gift exchange game. We will discuss how their findings
are related to ours in the discussion session.
In a similar vein as in our paper Fre´chette et al. (2013) design is not
based on a classic laboratory game. They frame their laboratory experiment
as a relationship between an investor and an intermediary and show how the
big five personality traits influence decision under risk when information is
not readily available to the investors. In their paper personality affects the
way individuals collect and transmit information not ready available, so, as
in our research, personality affects outcome when the tasks are performed
jointly by two individuals, an investor and the intermediary.
Beyond experimental research, Barrick et Mount (1991) present a meta-
5For convenience we report the statements entering into the Neuroticism score: 4. Is
depressed, blue. 9. Is relaxed, handles stress well (R). 14. Can be tense. 19. Worries a
lot. 24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset (R). 29. Can be moody. 34. Remains calm
in tense situations (R). 39. Gets nervous easily.
6In general, economists are starting to recognize the importance of introducing person-
ality traits in economic environment: Rustichini (2009) discusses on how personality can
be integrated in the classical economic model. Borghans et al., 2008 argue that data on
personality traits can be considered at least as stable as the economic preferences on risky
outcomes, inter-temporal payments and leisure.
7See deYoung et Gray 2010 for a comprehensive description of the recent literature on
personality traits.
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analysis showing how conscientiousness is a good predictor in all job perfor-
mances. Almlund et al., (2011) present the correlations of the Big Five and
IQ with job performance, and show that of the Big Five, Conscientiousness is
the most associated with job performance (is about half as predictive as IQ).
This finding, generally confirmed by a number of other studies, is consistent
with our result that conscientiousness is an important trait for cooperation,
if we consider the pervasiveness of cooperation in almost all kind of jobs.
There is also an experimental psychology literature on team work and
personality, which have focused on the qualitative nature of the roles within
the team; analyzing how traits influence the allocation of task roles and so-
cial roles and emphasising how Conscientiousness is important for the first
and Agreeableness for the second, hence in promoting social cohesion (Blum-
berg 2001, Stewart et al. 2005). Other studies have analyzed the impact of
personality on team settings (e.g. LePine et al., 1997; Barrick er al. 1998;
Mount et al. 1998; Barry and Stewart, 1999; Neuman and Wright 1999).
These studies are not in contrast with ours and, although interesting and
relevant for the economist, do not usually focus on the variables usually con-
sidered in economic models. In addition, studies in psychology usually do
not provide appropriate incentives to participants. Nevertheless, our result
that personality has a such different impact on cooperative rather than in-
dividual effort for otherwise identical tasks is, to the best of knowledge, new
and possibly relevant with respect to psychology literature as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment;
section 3 describes the main results. In the appendix we provide a formal
time-line of the experiment in 4. The questionnaire completed at the end by
subjects, the experimental instructions, the comprehension quiz presented to
the subject and the recruitment letter circulated are available in the supple-
mentary material.
2 Experimental Design
The design has two treatments, defined as control and cooperative. Subjects
performed exactly the same tasks in both treatments, but the final outcome
in the control treatment only depended on the individual effort of each sub-
ject, while the final outcome in the cooperative treatment was determined
by a combination of the effort of two subjects, randomly and anonymously
matched.
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Treatments and Tasks
In the control treatment subjects solved a simple arithmetic problem of
adding three series of ten two-digit numbers in the following way (a more
formal timeline of the experiment is presented in appendix 4):
1. Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits numbers,
say S1i = A
1
i +B
1
i + C
1
i +D
1
i + E
1
i in 4 minutes.
2. Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers, say S2i = A
2
i +B
2
i + C
2
i +D
2
i + E
2
i in 4 minutes.
3. Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above and the 10 numbers
obtained in step 2 above, producing for each i a sum Si = S
1
i + S
2
i in
2 minutes.
In the cooperative treatment subjects performed the same sequence of
additions, but jointly with an anonymous subject, as follows:
1. Perform 10 additions, indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits numbers,
say S1i = A
1
i +B
1
i + C
1
i +D
1
i + E
1
i in 4 minutes.
2. Perform 10 more additions, also indexed by i = 1, . . . , 10, of 5 two-digits
numbers, say S2i = A
2
i +B
2
i + C
2
i +D
2
i + E
2
i in 4 minutes.
3. The output of these 10 additions, S2i , i = 1, . . . , 10 is transferred to a
randomly marched and anonymous partner, and the 10 numbers output
produced by this partner is transferred in turn to the subject. We
denote by S∗2i the values obtained from the partner.
4. Add the 10 numbers obtained in step 1 above and the 10 numbers
obtained from the randomly matched partner, producing and output
Si = S
1
i + S
∗2
i in 2 minutes.
In all steps a clock on the screen was displaying the time elapsed. In the
cooperative treatment we reminded subjects at the beginning of the second
step that the 10 additions they were about to make would then be used by
another subject.
In both cases, the payment rule was 15 GBP (approximately 26 USD)
minus 1 for any incorrect final sum. A set of instructions in hard copy (avail-
able in the supplementary material) was distributed at the beginning and
subjects were quizzed with 3 questions of progressive difficulty to check their
comprehension. All subjects’ answers were checked and the task individually
re-explained if subjects made any mistake. Instructions were also reported
on a white board.
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After the task was completed, subjects performed a Raven Advanced
Progressive Matrices (APM) test of 15 tables for 30 seconds each table, paid
0.20 of GBP per correct answer. Before this test we showed subjects a table
with an example of a matrix and the correct answer below for 1 minute, to
explain the logic of the test.
The Raven test is a nonverbal test commonly used to measure reasoning
ability and general intelligence. In each test item, the tables show patterns
presented in the form of a 3x3 matrix, the subject is asked to identify the
missing element that completes a pattern. The Raven APM is appropriate for
adults and adolescents of higher average intelligence. The 15 tables presented
in order of progressive difficulty were selected from set II.
Finally, a standard Big Five personality questionnaire and other questions
were presented to the subjects who could answer with no time constraint.
In particular we use the Big Five Inventory (BFI) based on 44 question
with answer coded on a Likert scale. This version was developed by John,
Donahue and Kentle (1991) and recently investigated by John, Naumann
and Soto (2008).8 The BFI is particularly suitable for our purpose because
specifically designed for a sample of college and university students.
Implementation
We conducted 8 sessions for each treatment. In total 270 subjects (140 in the
control, 130 in the cooperative treatment) participated, all recruited from the
subject pool of the Warwick experimental laboratory. We used the DRAW
(“Decision Research at Warwick”) system, based on the ORSEE recruitment
software (the recruitment letter circulated is in the supplementary material).
Each session lasted 45 minutes. Subjects earned an average of about 11
GBP (approximately 18 USD), the participation payment was 4 GBP. The
breakdown and the dates of the different sessions are presented in table 7. 9
The software used for the entire experiment is z-tree (Fishbacher, 2007).
In the appendix, we present a more detailed description of the time-
line of the experiment and in the supplementary material, we present the
instructions and the quiz on the instructions administered to subjects. The
Ethical Approval of this design has been granted from Humanities and Social
Sciences Research Ethics Sub-Co at University of Warwick under DRAW
Umbrella Approval (Ref: 03/12-13).
8The questions can be downloaded from Oliver P John’s website called the Berkeley
Personality Lab http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~johnlab/bfi.htm.
9In session 14 there was an odd number of subjects. This session was part of the
cooperative treatment, where subjects are paired, so a computer position was filled by a
research assistant who performed the addition tasks. This observation has been dropped
from the sample.
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3 Result
The descriptive statistics of the main variables are presented in tables 1 and
2. Correct 1 is the number of correct answers in the first sum S1, and Correct
2 is the number of correct answers in the second sum S2. 10
Personality traits are measured on a scale between 1 and 5; Raven is the
score in the Raven APM. We are not considering the final answers Si, since
this is heavily dependent on the performances on S1 and S2. The reason we
introduced the last task of summing S1 and S2 was to stress the idea that
the final task was a joint contribution of the two subjects teamed together
in the cooperative treatment.
Samples in the two treatments were homogeneous: there is no statisti-
cally significant (at the 5 percent level or even above this threshold) differ-
ence between variables in the control and in the cooperative treatment if we
consider gender, age, personality traits, mathematics grades (the final high
school grade, in mathematics normalized between 0 and 1) quantitative (the
nature of the university degree subjects are undertaking coded as Yes= 1
and Not= 0 ) and non european (coded as 1 if the citizenship of the subjects
is non european, 0 otherwise).
Table 3 presents the correlations between the individual characteristics:
personality traits, Raven and gender. Both the sign and the size of the
correlations are the ones expected, with Neuroticism negatively correlated to
the other traits.
It is important to note that Correct 2 is not significantly different in the
two treatments (with p−value 0.26), while Correct 1 is slightly smaller by
about 0.4 in the cooperative treatment (with p−values 0.058). This result,
perhaps of independent interest in experimental tests of mechanisms, shows
that one treatment is not particularly more efficient than the other in pro-
ducing higher Correct 1 and Correct 2 and it is arguably a good characteristic
of our design because it increases the symmetry of the two treatments.
Model
In what follows we estimate the model:
10In the control treatment there is one more Correct 1 observation than Correct 2.
This occurs because subject made an error in encoding his answer in the second series of
additions. There was no reason to drop the observation since this is uncontaminated by
the subsequent error.
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Correctj = βOO + βCC + βEE + βAA+ βNN + βRR + (1)
Coop ∗ (β′OO + β′CC + β′EE + β′AA+ β′NN + β′RR) +
β′0Coop+ β0 + βFF + ΓDay + e;
with j=1.2.
Where O,C,E,A,N,R are the measures of Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Raven, respectively. F is equal to
1 if the subject is female, Day is the days’ dummies vector, representing the
day the subject i participated to the experiment. Coop is 1 if the treatment
is cooperative, e is the error term. In the model, β′x represents the differential
effect of the trait x and βx is the effect of the trait x in the control treatment.
The effect of x in the cooperative treatment is given by β′x + βx. To assess
the significance of this effect we will perform the test β′x + βx = 0.
Note that Correct 2 in the cooperative treatment is a clear measure of
the willingness of the subject to assist the anonymous partner, because the
output of this task is only used by the partner. Whereas Correct 1, in
the cooperative treatment is a clear measure of the subject to trust the
anonymous partner, because the output of this task is fully complementary
for the final result, to the output produced by the partner.
To help with the interpretation of the results, variables measuring per-
sonality traits and Raven score have been rescaled to assume a value between
0 to 1, using for each variable the transformation:
xi =
xˆi − xˆmin
xˆmax − xˆmin (2)
where xˆ represent the original value and xˆmax and xˆmin are the maximum
and minimum value of the variables.
Model estimation
The estimated equation of model 1, analyzing performances in the second
series of additions, measured by Correct 2 and in the first series of additions,
measured by Correct 1 is presented in table 4.
Furthermore, in the bottom panel of 4, we present the effect of the trait
x in the cooperative treatment, the sum β′x + βx in the model 1, with the
asterisk representing the level of significance the hypothesis β′x + βx = 0 can
be rejected.
9
Cooperative treatment
From columns 1 and 3 of table 4 we note that when we do not consider
the traits interacted by the dummy treatment, the dummy indicating the
cooperative treatment are small or non significant. However, when we intro-
duce the interacted terms, measuring the differential effect of the traits in
the two treatments, performance in the first and in the second addition is
substantially lower in the cooperative treatment than in the control, by 3.5
correct answers, as economic analysis of the task suggests.11 Hence, compar-
ing columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4 respectively, we can argue that
although the difference between cooperation and baseline treatment is rather
small or null in average, there are significant differences in the way different
personalities affect the final outcomes. Hence, we argue the following
Observation 3.1. There is little differences in average performances when
individuals act singularly or in cooperation. But, once the effect of personality
are taken into account, these differences become very large.
Neuroticism
Neuroticism has a positive differential effect in the cooperative treatment.
Considering the second column, from the magnitude of the coefficients we
conclude that an individual with high Neuroticism score performs about 1.7
additions more in the cooperative than in the control treatment (i.e. −3.5 +
5.1) in the second series of additions.
Furthermore, Neuroticism has a negative impact in the control treatment
as we note from the coefficient of Neuroticism in column 2 of table 4, but it
seems a positive determinant of the performances in the cooperative treat-
ment as we note from the bottom panel of 4.
Figure 1 illustrates the relation of performance in the second addition in
the two treatments and Neuroticism. The two regression lines show that less
neurotic individuals perform significantly better in the control treatment ,
while more neurotic individuals perform better in the cooperative treatment.
Furthermore, the relation is clearly negative in the control and it seems pos-
itive in the cooperative treatment.
Considering the fourth column of 4, we note a substantially similar effect
of Neuroticism on the 1st series of additions. In Correct 1 Neuroticism is
negative in the control task; positive, but non significant, in the cooperative
task; and the interaction with treatment is positive and significant, although
11This is natural: when computing the first addition subjects anticipate that the quality
of the input of the others will be lower, so the return to effort is lower. In the second
addition, the monetary return to effort is zero.
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its effect on the cooperative task seems smaller than in Correct 2. Therefore
we make the following:
Observation 3.2. Subjects with higher Neuroticism score have a comparative
weaker performance in the control treatment (with individual payment), but
are comparatively stronger in the cooperative treatment, especially in the task
of helping the partner.
Conscientiousness
From the fourth column of table 4 we note that conscientiousness has a
positive differential effect in the cooperative treatment for Correct 1. A
positive differential effect seems to exist also for Correct 2 although this last
is non significant, as we note from column 2. Furthermore, from the bottom
panel of table 4, we note that both Correct 2 and Correct 1 are increasing
in conscientiousness in the cooperative treatment, the overall effect is 2.5
additions, a quarter of the entire task for both Correct 2 and Correct 1;
while, from the top panel of 4 we note that conscientiousness does not have
a significant effect in the baseline treatment.
In figures 2 and 3, we plot the two regression lines of conscientiousness in
both treatments over Correct 2 and Correct 1 respectively, we can observe
this relation as well. We then make the following:
Observation 3.3. More conscientious subjects have a comparative stronger
performance in a cooperative treatment, especially in trusting the partner;
and they seem not to have significantly larger performance in the control
treatment.
Agreeableness
Finally from table 4, we note that the effect of agreeableness is non significant
in both treatments, nor it is significantly different in the two treatments.
Then, we can argue that:
Observation 3.4. More Agreeable subjects do not have comparatively higher
performance in the cooperative treatment, nor agreeableness is a predictor of
performances in the control treatment.
Openness and IQ
Openness has a negative differential effect in Correct 1 in cooperation and
it is weakly negatively associated with performances in cooperation, at the
same time but it does not have an effect in the baseline treatment. The Raven
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score is a strong predictor of performances in both Correct 2 and Correct 1
only for the control treatment and it is weaker and non significant for the
cooperative treatment. The differential effect is non significant.
In Figure 4 and 5 in the appendix we report for completeness the compar-
ison between control and cooperative treatment for all the Big Five factors
and for the Raven score.
Gender Effects
Women are usually considered more cooperative than men (see e.g. Kuhn
and Villeval 2013, for a recent contribution): it is therefore important to
assess how the gender effect interact with personality in determining the
performances in the two treatments.
In table 5 we introduce the dummy female interacted with cooperative
dummy indicating the treatment. Considering column 1, we note that female
have a comparative advantage in the cooperative treatment, but in column
2 we note that this disappear when we introduce the differential effect of
Neuroticism. So the comparative advantage of female subjects in the co-
operative treatment seems to be due to their Neuroticism rather than their
gender effect. From column 3, we note that female seem to trust more their
partners and perform better in Correct 1 of the cooperative treatment. This
effect seems not be particularly affected by the Neuroticism.
In table 6 we do a similar exercise than in table 5, in order to assess the
effect of gender on the effect of conscientiousness. From the column 4 we note
that both female and conscientiousness affect the trust in an independent
way.
4 Discussion
In our experimental design two identical tasks were performed under differ-
ent payment conditions. In one treatment the payment depended only on
the effort and skill provided by the individual who would then receive the
payment. In the other, the final payment was dependent on effort and skill
of the individual and of another, randomly matched participant; in this case
subjects knew that during the execution of a part of the task, they would
not directly benefit of the outcome of their effort, benefit which would in-
stead go to another participant in the session. It may be useful too regard
our design as a modified trust game. Both players have to decide how much
they trust the other, simultaneously and symmetrically, when they make the
first sum, because that effort will provide a return only if the other player
cooperates when his time comes to do the second sum. In the second move,
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when they have to do the sum that the other will use, they do it before they
know how much effort he contributed. In summary, our game can be consid-
ered as simultaneous moves trust game, where the reciprocating move is done
before the player knows how much the other contributed, and effort cost is
real, non monetary. Thus our design gives a condition (the control) that can
be used in the comparison of performance when the effort directly benefits
(in terms of the payment) the individual who provides it as compared to
the environment where someone else enjoys those monetary benefits. In our
experiment, willingness and inclination to cooperate is tested by voluntary
provision of mentally costly effort that is improving the outcome of others.
We may conclude that the difference in the quality of the output in the two
treatments is exclusively due to the different way in which subjects view the
relative merit of their and others’ payoff. We consider now how personality
traits are associated with differences in such attitude.
Possibly the most surprising and instructive conclusion of our study is
that the personality trait with a specifically social nature, Agreeableness,
is not associated with a significant difference in effort provision in the two
treatments. Given the questions in the survey, it is natural and plausible to
identify a high score in Agreeableness with a more generous and benevolent
stated attitude to others. The evidence of actions shows convincingly that
these statements are not necessarily followed by facts, when the cost associ-
ated with altruistic behavior is real effort rather than a monetary transfer.
In earlier experiments studying the association of personality traits with
strategic behavior, Agreeableness had similarly failed to provide convincing
evidence that cooperative behavior is associated with empathic feelings. For
example, Hirsh and Peterson (2009) do not find Agreeableness to be asso-
ciated with choice of Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Instead,
Neuroticism and Extraversion were found to be associated with choices of
cooperation. Pothos et al. (2010) find that Agreeableness is not associated
with choice of cooperation in the PD, although it is associated in the same
with off diagonal payoffs permuted where cooperation is the dominant strat-
egy. Interestingly, in Anderson et al. (2009), Agreeableness has a clear and
positive effect on cooperation (in a sequential PD, which is equivalent to a
Trust Game), a finding replicated in Becker et al. (2012). Consider however
that and most of the effect of this trait seems to be derived from the expec-
tation that others will cooperate– as we note from Anderson et al. (2009)
experiment, where beliefs were elicited. If one also considers that Agreeable-
ness is associated with an increase in the payment by second movers who
had received no payment, Agreeableness may be driven more by a general
naivete (or, less likely, by a weight on one’s payoff lower than on those of a
clearly selfish anonymous stranger).
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If, instead of the verbal statements, one relies on the relative provision
of costly effort in the control and cooperative treatment as reliable evidence,
then cooperative and trustful behavior is more effectively predicted by two
other traits: Conscientiousness and Neuroticism. A different way of stating
the conclusion is that an attitude favorable to others is not a matter of
preferences over outcomes, but of attitudes to processes. Note that the same
correlation of Neuroticism with cooperative behavior has been found by in
Hirsch and Peterson (2009) and in Anderson et al. (2009), see Table 9 and
10. Conscientiousness has a direct effect on performance in the addition
task only when the outcome is achieved cooperatively. This indicates that
Conscientiousness is associated with a positive response exclusively in this
condition, which seems the hallmark of what cooperation is. At the same
time more conscientious individuals do not seem to have an advantage in the
individual treatment, when there is a direct incentive to do it correctly, this
lends support to the idea that conscientiousness provides intrinsic motivation
complementary to the extrinsic motivation of the monetary incentives.
Also the negative effect of Openness is in line with the previous findings.
Although individuals with high levels of Openness may aid cooperation in
some particular instances where unconventional thinking is necessary, such
individuals are unfit in subordinating individual creativity in the context of
a collaborative work process, especially like the one subjects perform in our
experiment (Stewart et al.,2005).
Cognitive skill, in particular fluid intelligence as measured by Standard
Raven matrices, have been found to be associated with differences in behav-
ior in strategic environments. We find that Raven is a strong predictor of the
performances in the baseline (individual) treatment, while the same correla-
tion is weaker in the cooperative task, although the difference in statistically
non significant. Hence, the direction of the relation provides only a weak
support to the natural conjecture that higher IQ should provide a sharper
awareness on one’s self interest. On this point our finding is in line with the
existing literature.
In conclusion, willingness and inclination to work with others is affected
more by a conscientious attitude to work rather than positive and empathic
attitude to others. It is soon to hypothesize a causal channel (and a stable
trait inducing more cooperation); but a natural hypothesis we can suggest
is that people with higher score in conscientiousness are inclined to perform
the task because it is the “thing to do”, irrespective of the specific incentives.
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Table 1: Control Treatment, Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Correct 1 7.243 2.26 1 10 140
Correct 2 7.583 2.242 1 10 139
Age 21.3 3.003 18 34 140
Female 0.514 0.502 0 1 140
Quantitative Degree 0.536 0.501 0 1 140
Maths Grades 0.881 0.146 0.5 1 132
Non European 0.307 0.463 0 1 140
Raven 8.443 2.696 0 13 140
Openness 3.573 0.589 1.9 5 140
Conscientiousness 3.452 0.626 1.667 4.889 140
Extraversion 3.333 0.704 1.625 4.875 140
Agreeableness 3.71 0.559 2.111 5 140
Neuroticism 2.967 0.673 1.375 4.75 140
Table 2: Cooperative Treatment, Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Correct 1 6.8 2.297 2 10 130
Correct 2 7.408 2.368 0 10 130
Age 21.969 4.59 18 52 130
Female 0.538 0.5 0 1 130
Quantitative Degree 0.523 0.501 0 1 130
Maths Grades 0.887 0.156 0.25 1 123
Non European 0.31 0.464 0 1 129
Raven 7.992 2.686 0 13 130
Openness 3.587 0.589 2.1 4.9 130
Conscientiousness 3.579 0.676 2 4.889 130
Extraversion 3.287 0.788 1.5 4.75 130
Agreeableness 3.639 0.617 2 5 130
Neuroticism 2.966 0.792 1.25 4.875 130
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Table 4: Analysis of the performances: OLS estimator Correct 1 are
the correct additions used by the subject performing them in both the in-
dividual and the cooperative treatment. Correct 2 are the correct additions
passed to the respective partners in the cooperative treatment. The variables
representing personality traits and Raven have been rescaled to take a value
between 0 and 1. Constant and the dummies for Day are omitted. Robust
Standard Errors in Brackets.
Correct 2 Correct 2 Correct 1 Correct 1
Cooperative Treatment –0.2324 –3.5013* –0.4857* –3.3493*
(0.2777) (2.0961) (0.2699) (1.9592)
Coop.*Neuroticism 5.1089*** 3.4752**
(1.4924) (1.4706)
Coop.*Conscientiousness 1.8298 3.2380**
(1.2885) (1.3490)
Coop.*Agreeableness 0.6361 0.8724
(1.3234) (1.3696)
Coop.*Extraversion 1.3596 2.1148*
(1.3255) (1.2165)
Coop.*Openness –1.9167 –2.9634*
(1.7263) (1.5576)
Coop.*Raven –0.3954 –1.0483
(1.2736) (1.1922)
Neuroticism –0.0806 –3.1139*** –0.1384 –2.3125**
(0.7631) (0.9766) (0.7745) (1.0774)
Conscientiousness 1.8109*** 0.7942 1.0593 –0.7067
(0.6879) (0.8846) (0.6658) (0.9690)
Agreeableness 0.5811 0.0211 0.2724 –0.5247
(0.6776) (1.0029) (0.7144) (0.9524)
Extraversion –0.5496 –1.3726 –0.5850 –1.8705**
(0.6467) (0.8714) (0.6302) (0.8592)
Openness –1.2965 –0.0192 –0.8371 0.8784
(0.8550) (1.0085) (0.7857) (1.0677)
Raven 1.9006*** 2.0454*** 1.8931*** 2.3564***
(0.5946) (0.7579) (0.6018) (0.7351)
Female –0.3548 –0.3398 –0.5440* –0.5377**
(0.2655) (0.2639) (0.2763) (0.2710)
Determinants in Cooperation
Neuroticism 1.995* 1.1627
p− value : β′N + βN = 0 0.0794 0.2699
Conscientiousness 2.624*** 2.5313***
p− value : β′C + βC = 0 0.0085 0.0069
Agreeableness 0.6572 0.3477
p− value : β′A + βA = 0 0.4574 0.7257
Extraversion -0.0130 0.2443
p− value : β′E + βE = 0 0.9897 0.7818
Openness -1.9359* -2.085*
p− value : β′O + βO = 0 0.1745 0.0698
Raven 1.65* 1.3081
p− value : β′R + βR = 0 0.0977 0.1661
r2 0.138 0.190 0.133 0.188
N 269 269 270 270
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Table 5: Effect of gender in the difference of performances between
individual and cooperative treatments: OLS estimator Standard er-
rors between brackets. The 1st series of additions are always used by the
subject performing them in both the individual and the cooperative treat-
ment. the 2nd of additions are passed to the respective partners in the co-
operative treatment. The variables representing the traits and Raven have
been rescaled so to assume a value between 0 and 1. Robust Standard Errors
in Brackets.
Correct 2 Correct 2 Correct 1 Correct 1
1 2 3 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Cooperative Treatment –0.8434* –2.4881*** –1.2349*** –1.9091***
(0.4313) (0.7614) (0.3954) (0.7004)
Coop.*Female 1.1828** 0.7373 1.4439*** 1.2644**
(0.5494) (0.5431) (0.5337) (0.5495)
Coop.*Neuroticism 3.9553*** 1.6218
(1.3654) (1.4004)
Neuroticism –0.1589 –2.3960** –0.2452 –1.1567
(0.7559) (0.9352) (0.7720) (1.0099)
Conscientiousness 1.6665** 1.7149** 0.8905 0.9060
(0.6907) (0.6921) (0.6584) (0.6617)
Agreeableness 0.5627 0.5267 0.2484 0.2344
(0.6674) (0.6610) (0.7019) (0.7028)
Extraversion –0.5393 –0.5683 –0.5806 –0.5881
(0.6350) (0.6411) (0.6250) (0.6279)
Openness –1.2313 –1.0206 –0.7614 –0.6727
(0.8477) (0.8465) (0.7954) (0.7945)
Raven 1.8152*** 1.8063*** 1.7885*** 1.7848***
(0.6001) (0.5913) (0.6123) (0.6115)
Female –0.9047** –0.6811* –1.2110*** –1.1231***
(0.3605) (0.3514) (0.3592) (0.3521)
Constant 6.0462*** 6.7493*** 6.4720*** 6.7577***
(1.1644) (1.1505) (1.0786) (1.1032)
Day Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.154 0.180 0.157 0.161
N 269 269 270 270
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Table 6: Effect of gender in the difference of performances between
individual and cooperative treatments: OLS estimator. Standard
errors between brackets. The 1st series of additions are always used by the
subject performing them in both the individual and the cooperative treat-
ment. the 2nd of additions are passed to the respective partners in the co-
operative treatment. The variables representing the traits and Raven have
been rescaled so to assume a value between 0 and 1. Robust Standard Errors
in Brackets.
Correct 2 Correct 2 Correct 1 Correct 1
1 2 3 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Cooperative Treatment –0.8434* –1.5883* –1.2349*** –2.9126***
(0.4313) (0.8529) (0.3954) (0.8271)
Coop.*Female 1.1828** 1.1475** 1.4439*** 1.3578**
(0.5494) (0.5516) (0.5337) (0.5276)
Coop.*Conscientiousness 1.3335 3.0028**
(1.2923) (1.3080)
Neuroticism –0.1589 –0.1668 –0.2452 –0.2747
(0.7559) (0.7541) (0.7720) (0.7547)
Conscientiousness 1.6665** 0.9663 0.8905 –0.6773
(0.6907) (0.8806) (0.6584) (0.9446)
Agreeableness 0.5627 0.5265 0.2484 0.1655
(0.6674) (0.6618) (0.7019) (0.6878)
Extraversion –0.5393 –0.5822 –0.5806 –0.6859
(0.6350) (0.6332) (0.6250) (0.6109)
Openness –1.2313 –1.2086 –0.7614 –0.7148
(0.8477) (0.8509) (0.7954) (0.7911)
Raven 1.8152*** 1.7943*** 1.7885*** 1.7414***
(0.6001) (0.6005) (0.6123) (0.6135)
Female –0.9047** –0.9021** –1.2110*** –1.1972***
(0.3605) (0.3599) (0.3592) (0.3569)
Constant 6.0462*** 6.4981*** 6.4720*** 7.4947***
(1.1644) (1.1871) (1.0786) (1.1572)
Day Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.154 0.157 0.157 0.173
N 269 269 270 270
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Figure 1: Correct sums in the 2nd series of additions and Neuroti-
cism. The dotted line is the control treatment, the solid line represents the
cooperative treatment, both the 95% confidence intervals are displayed .
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Figure 2: Correct sums in the 2nd series of additions and Conscien-
tiousness. The dotted line is the control treatment, the solid line represents
the cooperative treatment, both the 95% confidence intervals are displayed .
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Figure 3: Correct sums in the 1st series of additions and Conscien-
tiousness. The dotted line is the control treatment, the solid line represents
the cooperative treatment, both the 95% confidence intervals are displayed .
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Appendix
Timeline of the Experiment
1. At the beginning participants were assigned a Project ID card, with a
number corresponding to a computer station and a paper in hard copy
with the illustration of the task they were going to perform. They were
asked questions at the end to check for comprehension.
2. An illustration of the task was presented on a white board.
3. Participants are seated in the laboratory at individual, private com-
puter terminals, corresponding to their Project ID cards.
4. Participants read and answer the questions in the instruction paper
distributed to them to check their comprehension of the exercise.
5. In sessions 1, 4, 6, 7 participants face the control exercise. In sessions
2 of day 1 and 1 and 3 of day 2 they face the treatment exercise.
6. In the control treatment participants had to add three series of 10 two-
digit numbers in the following way:
(a) Perform i = 10 additions of 5 randomly chosen two-digits num-
bers, say S1i = A
1
i +B
1
i +C
1
i +D
1
i +E
1
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 in 4 minutes
(with a clock showing the time on the screen).
(b) Perform another i = 10 additions of 5 two-digits numbers, say
S2i = A
2
i +B
2
i + C
2
i +D
2
i + E
2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 in 4 minutes (with a
clock showing the time on the screen)
(c) Adding the 10 numbers obtained sub a) and the 10 numbers ob-
tained sub b): Si = S
1
i + S
2
i for every i = 1, . . . , 10 in 2 minutes.
7. In the cooperative treatment, individuals perform the task in pair as
follows:
(a) perform 10 additions of 5 two-digits numbers, S1i = A
2
i + B
2
i +
C2i + D
2
i + E
2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 in 4 minutes (with a clock showing
the time on the screen).
(b) perform 10 additions of 5 two-digits numbers, S2i = A
2
i + B
2
i +
C2i + D
2
i + E
2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 in 4 minutes (with a clock showing
the time on the screen). This series of 10 numbers: S2i was then
transferred to another subjects randomly chosen, and the same
subject will pass his or her 10 numbers: S∗2i . The fact that the
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10 additions made by a subject will be used by another subject is
reminded at this stage as well.
(c) Adding the 10 numbers obtained sub a) and the 10 numbers
obtained sub b) from the randomly matched subject. : Si =
S1i + S
∗2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 in 2 minutes.
8. Raven test, 15 tables for 30 seconds each table. Each correct answer
was paid 0.20 GBP.
9. The questionnaire is presented and filled.
10. The payment rule is 15 GBP minus 1 GBP for any error in the 10
sums S1i + S
∗2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 for the cooperative treatment or in the
sum S1i + S
2
i , i = 1, . . . , 10 for the control treatment.
11. Subjects were paid.
We report in the Supplementary Information the entire test for:
1. Instructions and Quiz questions for the control/Individual treatment
2. Instructions Quiz questions for the cooperative treatment
3. General questions in the final Questionnaire
4. Personality Traits Questions and Scoring Instructions
5. The Big Five Aspect Scale
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Dates of Sessions
Table 7: Dates.
Day Session Subjects Treatment
1 (13/06/2012) 1 15 Individual
1 (13/06/2012) 2 16 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 3 20 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 4 20 Individual
2 (14/06/2012) 5 16 Cooperative
2 (14/06/2012) 6 16 Individual
3 (19/06/2012) 7 20 Individual
3 (19/06/2012) 8 10 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 9 16 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 10 20 Cooperative
4 (15/05/2013) 11 15 Individual
4 (15/05/2013) 12 19 Individual
5 (15/05/2013) 13 16 Cooperative
5 (15/05/2013) 14 17 Cooperative
5 (15/05/2013) 15 16 Individual
5 (15/05/2013) 16 19 Individual
28
Figures
Figure 4: Correct sums in the 2nd series of additions, Personality
traits and Raven score. The dotted line is the individual (that is, baseline)
treatment, the solid line represents the cooperative treatment, both the 95%
confidence intervals are displayed .
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Figure 5: Correct sums in the 1st series of additions, Personality
traits and Raven score. The dotted line is the individual (that is, baseline)
treatment, the solid line represents the cooperative treatment, both the 95%
confidence intervals are displayed .
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